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Introduction 
          
    
With the increase in the use of digital communication technologies such as social media 
networks, online hate speech has become an increasingly prevalent and visible problem 
which threatens cohesion and trust amongst online citizens, and hence their ability to work 
together to control their environment, what social scientists have term ‘collective efficacy’ 
(Sampson et al. 1997).  Social media acts as a polarization amplifier – it opens up a potential 
space for the galvanising of attitudes and emotions, via the spread of negative expression 
towards minority groups and counter-narratives accelerated by algorithm driven partisan 
network contagion (Sunstein 2017). Over the past decade, social media has become a safe 
harbour for launching campaigns of antisemitism, including harassment and criminal threats 
directed at members of the Jewish community.  In the first six months of 2019, Community 
Security Trust, a charity that supports the Jewish community, recorded 323 online 
antisemitic incidents in the UK, representing 36% of all incidents.  This represents an 
increase of 46% on the same period the year before (CST 2019). Understandably, 
antisemitism on social media has become a matter of concern in the Jewish community and 
in broader public debate. Although conventional hate crime recording (i.e. police crime 
records and Crime Survey of England and Wales), has been improving, both online and 
offline antisemitic incidents are significantly under-reported, leading to a significant dark 
figure. Unlike previous research that has aimed to outline patterns of online antisemitism 
(e.g. ADL 2018; Finkelstein et al. 2018; Woolley and Joseff 2019), this paper illustrates a 
scalable methodology that can identify future antisemitic communications and reveal 
patterns of online antisemitic perpetration at source. Furthermore, the paper addresses the 
‘collective efficacy’ phenomenon on social media in the case of controlling antisemitic 
communications. 
 
      
In this paper, we present an analysis of the production and propagation of online 
antagonistic content targeting Jewish people posted on Twitter between October 2015 and 
October 2016 in the United Kingdom. We collect data from Twitter’s streaming API using 
keywords which explicitly make reference to Jewish people and/or to Jewish identity and 
locate 2.7 million tweets from UK-based users. Drawing on emerging computational 
criminology methods, we train a machine learning algorithm to classify antisemitic content 
on Twitter with high accuracy and at scale (Burnap and Williams 2015; Burnap and Williams 
2016; Williams and Burnap 2016). After illustrating significant variability in the frequency of 
antagonistic tweets related to Jewish identity, we identify three ‘spikes’ in antagonistic 
content, the highest of which follows the suspension of MPs from the Labour party over 
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antisemitism allegations. We then examine these three spikes by building statistical models 
around 15-day study windows. We model Twitter information flows (retweets) and explore 
i) the inhibiting and enabling factors of online antisemitism; ii) the propagation of 
antisemitic content in terms of size (number of retweets) and survival (duration of 
retweets); and iii) the types of actors (e.g. Jewish organisations, antisemitic actors, media 
agents, MPs) that gain significant information flow traction. This paper contributes to 
academic literature in three distinct ways: it introduces a supervised machine learning 
model capable of identifying future antisemitic incidents; it reveals patterns of online 
antisemitism perpetration at source; and for the first time, it introduces collective efficacy 
as a useful concept for interpreting the countering of online hate in a social media context. 
Literature Review 
Hate crimes, Social media, Cyberhate  
Hate crimes have the potential to damage the fabric of trust between communities within 
society by undermining social cohesion. Current literature underlines the importance of the 
social polarization behind the mechanics of hate crime victimisation. Gerstenfeld argues 
that the motivation behind hate crimes is not necessarily the hate directed towards the 
individual victim but rather the victim’s perceived ‘outgroup’ status (2017). Complementing 
this view, Perry explains that hate crimes aim to polarise communities by sending 
‘messages’ to the wider community of the ‘others’ that they must ‘conform to the 
standards’ set by the privileged majority (2001, p.5). From a broad societal point of view, 
fluctuations with regard to polarization can be observed via hate crime statistics. Studying 
hate crime figures from conventional quantitative data sources such as police crime records 
and self-report studies (e.g. victimisation and crime surveys) may prove to be beneficial in 
order to understand the patterns of divisive tensions within a society, provided that biases 
attached to these data sources are carefully considered when drawing conclusions.  
 
Data from conventional sources suggest that hate crime is on the rise in England and Wales. 
According to the most recent records, hate crimes recorded by the police in England and 
Wales have increased by 17 per cent, from 80,393 (2016/17) to 94,098 (2017/18) (Home 
Office 2018). The upward trend in police-recorded hate crime has been seen since 2012/13. 
Figures have more than doubled (123%) in England and Wales with an increase from 42,255 
(2012/13) to 94,098 (2017/18). Although these figures are important barometer of societal 
tensions between groups, criminologists have long argued that the statistics produced by 
police are insufficient to paint a complete picture to understand both general and hate 
crime patterns. Existing criminological literature illustrates a number of limitations of police 
recorded crime data such as non-uniform recording practices across police forces, 
improvements and changes in police recording practices over time, and changes in 
legislation and classification of offence types (Maguire 2007; Tilley and Tseloni 2016). In  
relation to hate crimes, these data sources are incomplete as at least half of all hate victims 
do not report their victimisation (Williams and Tregidga 2014). A recent Home Office report 
recognises some of the shortcomings of police recorded hate crime figures, suggesting that 
the increases in recent years are ‘largely driven by improvements in police recording’ (2018, 
p.7). 





Another useful conventional data source to understand hate crime victimisation figures is 
the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW). Surveying a nationally representative 
sample of roughly 35,000 households each year, the CSEW is regarded ‘as a gold-standard 
survey of its kind’ (Flatley 2014, p.199). Recent estimates from the CSEW show that racial 
and religious aggravated hate crimes increased by 4.5 per cent, from 112,000 per year 
(2013-15 two-year average) to 117,000 per year (2015-17 two-year average). Combined 
estimates suggests that there were 184,000 hate incidents per year from 2015/16 to 
2017/18 (Home Office 2018, p.7). Despite the robust nature of CSEW statistics, they are 
limited by their reliance upon victim interviews. Some victims of hate incidents might not be 
willing to report hate crime in victimisation surveys. For instance, the wording (i.e. using the 
term ‘hate crime’) of questions in surveys can be problematic. Williams and Tregidga found 
that while some survey respondents may find the word ‘hate’ too restrictive, others may be 
confused by the word ‘crime’, hesitating ‘whether their experiences constituted acts serious 
enough to be classified as crimes’ (2014, p.948). Correspondingly, some victims prefer not to 
report the prejudiced incidents they experienced either to the police or in surveys, leading 
to dark figures in hate crime victimisation rates. 
 
 
Given the shortcomings of conventional police hate crime and victimisation data, it is 
important to supplement these with other sources to paint a more complete picture. New 
data sources, such as internet searches and social media communications, lend themselves 
well to the analysis of public sentiment trends. Recent computational and social science 
advances in machine learning and statistical modelling allow researchers to utilise new ‘big 
data’ sources to address a variety of social research questions, such as tracking the spread 
of influenza (Ginsberg et al. 2009) or to build psychological constructs of nations linked to 
GDP (Noguchi et al. 2014). Furthermore, Twitter posts have been used to investigate the 
spread of hate speech following terrorist attacks (Williams and Burnap 2016) and to 
estimate offline crime patterns (Williams et al. 2017). Besides conventional hate crime 
statistics, othering and divisive sentiment trends within society can also manifest in subtler 
forms, such as prejudiced online communications. Referred to as cyberhate, these divisive 
and prejudiced online communications have been present since the dawn of the public 
internet in the 1990s (Williams 2006; Wall and Williams 2007). Similar to offline hate crimes, 
the motivation of cyberhate perpetrators is rarely the hate of individual victims, but the 
community of ‘others’ in which they represent (Douglas et al. 2005). Previous cyberhate 
literature illustrates that perpetrators target victims because of their perceived belonging to 
groups with protected characteristics such as sexual orientation (McKenna and Bargh 1998), 
race (Leets 2001), and religion (Williams and Burnap 2016). By analysing prejudiced online 
communications, we can identify the ebb and flow of societal tensions via the monitoring of 
subtler ‘hate incidents’, many of which would not reach the criminal threshold used by law 
enforcement agencies, and therefore would not be included in conventional hate crime 
statistics. Therefore, current researchers and practitioners should take advantage of the 
affordances provided by online communications data and supplement conventional 
statistics with cyberhate perpetration in order to shed light on ‘dark’ figures of hate crime 
victimisation trends.  
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Collective efficacy and Social Media 
 
Social media companies have generally presented themselves as strong advocates of free-
speech and have until very recently allowed hate speech to proliferate on their platforms. 
Online hate speech has become an increasing problem that to date has been largely 
controlled by online community cooperation, what social scientists term ‘collective efficacy’ 
(Sampson et al. 1997, p.918). Sampson describes collective efficacy as ‘the linkage of mutual 
trust and shared willingness and intention to intervene for the common good’ (2001, p.95). 
On social media platforms, an abundance of cyberhate speech in the absence of capable and 
willing counter-speech actors can reduce collective efficacy which, in turn, can result in 
decreased trust in platforms, their users and online communities. On the contrary, if 
capable, trustworthy, and willing actors on social media platforms can successfully intervene 
cyberhate perpetrators with counter-speech, we can observe the benefits of online 
collective efficacy. Current research on online collective efficacy is scarce. In a 
demographically balanced survey of Americans, Costello et al. (2017) explored the presence 
of online collective efficacy and found that 21.3 per cent of respondents reported that they 
observe others telling perpetrators of cyberhate to stop, and 21 per cent indicated that they 
witnessed others defending victims of cyberhate. However, their logistic regression model 
failed to demonstrate a statistically significant association -neither positive nor negative- 
between either form of collective efficacy and being targeted by cyberhate.1 Therefore, 
unlike the long-proven negative correlation between the perception of collective efficacy in 
offline communities and offline crime rates (Sampson et al. 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2010), the 
effectiveness of collective efficacy on social media platforms is yet to be proven in the 
literature.  
 
Data from social media platforms can be utilised to explore the effectiveness of collective 
efficacy on online communities. Social media communications can be amplified and 
redistributed through platform-specific dissemination mechanisms such as retweeting (Boyd 
et al. 2010). This unique conversational aspect of online communications enables 
researchers to study online information propagation networks and information flows. Unlike 
traditional methods, such as surveys or interviews, through studying information flows via 
retweets, researchers can ‘identify what information or sentiment is being endorsed and 
propagated by users, and which users have the most or least influence in the spread of such 
messages’ (Williams and Burnap 2016, p.215). By comparing the retweet rates of 
trustworthy and capable users engaged in counter-speech practices to rates of retweets of 
biased and prejudiced users engaged in spreading divisive messages and cyberhate, 
arguably researchers can measure a proxy of collective efficacy in online communities.  
  
 
1 The same study reports that a smaller number of respondents indicated that they frequently tell the 
cyberhate perpetrators to stop (10.2%) or frequently defend the victims (13.7%). The authors also report a 
positive association between cyberhate victimisation and those who personally confronted cyberhate 
perpetrators themselves (termed as self-help in the paper). This group was 1.73 times more likely to be 
targeted by the cyberhate, unlike those who witnessed the presence of collective efficacy. 
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Related Work: Offline and Online Antisemitism 
In this paper we focus our attention solely on the growing problem of online antisemitism in 
the UK, which is an important policy and community safety issue. In a survey conducted by 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) amongst individuals who consider 
themselves Jewish in eight European countries, including the UK, 75 per cent (n=5,847) 
stated that they consider online antisemitism as a problem (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2013, p.12). In addition, 75 per cent of the respondents who were 
exposed to negative statements towards Jews (n=5,385), cited the internet as the medium 
that exposed them to negative sentiments (p. 25).2 Of those who were exposed to 
antisemitic harassment (n=1941), which can be both online and offline, only 23 per cent 
stated that the incident was reported to the police, to another organisation or both, while 
76 per cent stated that the event was not reported at all (p.49). Given the staggering rates 
of non-reported antisemitic victimisation and the growing concerns about online 
antisemitism, FRA suggested that the ‘EU Member States should consider establishing 
specialised police units that monitor and investigate hate crime on the internet and put in 
place measures to encourage users to report any antisemitic content they detect to the 
police.’ (p. 12). To our knowledge, there are no specialised units dedicated to tracking online 
antisemitism at the source in any EU states to date.    
Previous research on detecting and analysing online antisemitic incidents at the source is of 
particular interest to this study. Analysing over 100M posts from multiple social media 
platform hosting ‘fringe’ communities (4 chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and 
Reddit’s The_Donald subreddit and Gab), Finkelstein et al. (2018) argued that online 
antisemitism and racist online communications increased considerably following divisive 
offline political events such as the 2016 US election.3 By training word2vec models, they 
devised a text-based methodology which predicts similar words that are likely to appear 
together in the same context. Although useful for exploring keyword-based discussions of 
online fringe communities, the unsupervised nature of this methodology limits its 
practicality for classifying future individual antagonistic instances. Barring this paper, most 
of the existing research on the detection of online antisemitism are commissioned or 
conducted by Jewish civil society organisations such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
and CST.4 From January 2017 to January 2018, ADL collected more than 18 million tweets 
using keywords referring to Jews and Jewish identity (ADL 2018). By randomly sampling 
1,000 tweets per week that matched with a complex Boolean query and manually 
annotating n=55,000, ADL predicted 4.2 million tweets (23.5% of all tweets collected) were 
antisemitic within the study period. In another mixed-methods study on Twitter, Wooley 
and Joseff (2019) explored antisemitism among 5.8 million tweets containing political 
hashtags during the 2018 US midterm election campaign. Human annotation of 99,075 
filtered tweets revealed that 54.1 per cent contained antisemitic conspiracy theories and  
 
2 The internet was followed by ‘in a social situation’ with 51%, ‘amongst the general public’ with 47% and ‘at 
political events’ with 42% as the most common places where respondents encountered antisemitism. 
3 Although understanding the differences and similarities between these three platforms, especially their user 
base, platform-specific regulations, and platform information propagation mechanics is important, limited space 
precludes a lengthier discussion here. See Finkelstein et al. (2018) for a discussion.  
4 Both ADL and CST aim to record, aggregate and report antisemitic incidents and help victims of antisemitic 
abuse. While the former focus their efforts to the USA, the latter focus on the UK. 
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46.45 per cent contained derogatory terms.5 Although these three studies are important to 
understanding trends in online antisemitic sentiment, none detail the accuracy of the 
content classification results or provide a discussion of common information retrieval 
metrics such as precision, recall, and F-measure. Lastly, none of these studies suggests a 
methodology to accurately identify future antisemitic incidents without human annotation. 
 
Given the limitations of current research, new research on the automated detection of 
antisemitic cyberhate and the statistical dynamics of its propagation is needed. Instead of 
relying on conventional ‘terrestrial’ data sources, this paper reveals patterns of online 
antisemitic perpetration at source. Although there are multiple social media platforms 
where antisemitism can be traced, we exclusively draw on Twitter data due to the ease of 
access and the ability to explore information propagation networks through the retweeting 
mechanism. Following a human annotation phase, we trained a supervised machine learning 
classifier that is capable of classifying antisemitic content at scale. Informed by the collective 
efficacy theory, our hypotheses address the enablers and inhibitors of antisemitic content 




H1: Offline events and discussions concerning Jews will act as ‘trigger events’ and be observed as spikes in 
online communications related to Jewish identity. 
 
The event-specific increase in hate crimes is an established phenomenon in the literature. 
For instance, Hanes and Machin (2014) observed significant increases in hate crimes 
reported to the police in the UK following 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks. Similarly, in the 
aftermath of Woolwich terror attack in 2013, Williams and Burnap observed a sudden spike 
and a rapid de-escalation in the frequency of racial and religious cyberhate speech within 
the first 48 hours of the attack (Williams and Burnap 2016). Findings from these studies 
indicate that galvanising ‘trigger’ events such as socially divisive political events and terror 
attacks motivate prejudiced incidents against outgroups and lead to an increase in incidents 
targeting minorities, which is reflected in hate crime statistics. Informed by previous 
research, we hypothesise that offline events that trigger debate around Jewish identity will 
migrate to social media. 
 
H2: Pre-identified antisemitic Twitter users will be positively correlated with the production of antagonistic 
content about Jews. 
 
The second hypothesis tests whether Twitter users flagged by Jewish civil society 
organisations as antisemitic due to their previous online behaviour are predictive of 
cyberhate production.  
 
5 The authors report that ‘age-old anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are flourishing, particularly among Twitter 
users that identify as Republicans and/or supporters of President Trump’ (p.10). The most common conspiracy 
was related to ‘Soros’ keyword with 85% of tweets containing this keyword being antisemitic. The authors also 
observed that majority of users spreading antisemitic sentiments were human operated (i.e. they were not bots) 
and of those, only 4.7% were suspended by March 15, 2019. 
 




H3: Trustworthy and capable actors will be positively associated with larger size of information flows.  
H4: Trustworthy and capable actors will be positively associated with longer survival of information flows.  
 
H3 and H4 operationalise collective efficacy theory on Twitter. Sampson underlines the 
importance of ‘mutual trust and shared willingness’ for the capable and trustworthy actors 
who are willing to ‘intervene for the common good’ (2001). On Twitter, by comparing the 
retweet rates of trustworthy and capable users to rates of retweets of biased and 
prejudiced users engaged in spreading divisive messages and cyberhate, researchers can 
measure a proxy of the collective efficacy phenomenon. These hypotheses test whether 
trustworthy and capable agents, such as Jewish community organisations, verified accounts, 
official police accounts, and Members of Parliament, are associated with larger size and 
longer survival of information flows, lending evidence for the effectiveness of collective 
efficacy within the particular community of interest on Twitter.  
 
H5: Antagonistic content about Jews will not propagate further in size, within the study period. 
H6: Antagonistic content about Jews will not survive over time, within the study period.  
  
H5 and H6 extend the previous research on computational criminology by exploring the 
propagation dimension of the antagonistic speech targeting Jews and Jewish identity 
(Williams and Burnap 2016). Within the study period, if cyberhate does not propagate in size 
and if it does not survive over time, we can tentatively infer an association between 
collective efficacy and a reduction in the impact of the information flows containing 
antagonistic sentiments within the particular community of interest on Twitter. Informed by 
previous research, we assume that antisemitic tweets will be negatively associated with 
both size and survival of information flows.  
Methodology 
Data Collection and preprocessing  
 
 
The data used in this study were collected using the COSMOS platform (Burnap et al. 2015), 
a free software tool that allows researchers to connect directly to Twitter’s streaming 
Application Programming Interface (API) to collect real-time social media posts by specifying 
keywords. The following keywords were used for data collection: ‘jew, jewish, jews, 
antisemitic, anti-semitic, antisemitism, anti-semitism, anti semitic, anti semitism, bonehill, 
stamford hill, golders green, neo nazis, neo nazi, neonazi, neo-nazis, nazi, nazis’.6 These 
keywords are a combination of generic terms and terms relating to a far-right 
demonstration directed at the Jewish community in Golders Green in north London, 
reflecting events in the UK at the time of the data collection. This list was not intended to be 
a comprehensive set of keywords relating to all aspects of antisemitic hate speech. In 
particular, much antisemitic hate speech comes in the form of conspiracy theories (or 
allusions to such theories) and image-based hate speech -such as memes- that would not be 
captured by these keywords (Finkelstein et al. 2018; Woolley and Joseff 2019). This caveat 
 
6 In order to prevent missing keywords relevant to Jewish identity, we consulted and agreed these keywords with 
CST. 
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should be borne in mind when assessing the overall quantity of antagonistic content 
measured by this research and the generalisability of the findings. The data used for this 
analysis include tweets posted between 16/10/2015 and 21/10/2016 and were collected in 
real-time, ensuring all tweets matching with the keywords are collected. The raw dataset for 
the complete study period contained 31,282,472 tweets.7 The dataset was imported into 
the R environment (R Core Team 2018), which is an open-source statistical programming 
language, for preprocessing and exploratory data analysis (EDA).  
 
The first aim of preprocessing was to infer the location of users from tweet metadata and 
extract UK-based tweets from the whole dataset. Unless Twitter users explicitly opt-in to 
share their geo-locations each time they post a tweet, latitude and longitude coordinates 
are not provided in the metadata. The majority of Twitter users in this dataset (>99%) opted 
out of sharing these exact geo-data. Three different approaches were adopted to infer 
Twitter communications from the UK, using the metadata of each tweet. First, we derived a 
list of UK based place names (referenced as the UK pattern henceforth). Using pattern 
matching techniques, the UK pattern was identified within the account description of the 
users. Second, the UK pattern was identified within the user reported locations field (shown 
under profile pictures). Lastly, London and Edinburgh were selected from Twitter time-zone 
user selections (the only two UK-based time zones Twitter provides). In total 2,677,058 
tweets were identified as emanating from UK-based users.8 The number of tweets identified 
as emanating from the UK in this study is therefore 8.5 per cent. This figure is in line with 
general global usage patterns: in Q2 2016 there were circa 313 million active Twitter 
accounts, and approximately 6.4 per cent of these accounts were located within the UK 
(Statista 2019).  
 
The second aim of preprocessing was to classify user types that were of interest for analysis. 
Using conventional data science methods and tweet metadata and collaborating with 
organisations with subject expertise, six user types of interest were identified i.e. Media 
Agents; Members of Parliament (MPs); Celebrity Agents; Police Agents; Jewish Organisation 
Agents; and known Antisemitic Agents. To identify Media Agents, pattern matching was 
used against a list of keywords that the media frequently employ in their account 
descriptions (the media pattern). In total, 181,363 tweets were identified as emanating from 
Media Agents.9 Drawing on previous work by Bejda (2015), we used a list of the most 
followed celebrities on Twitter and by matching them with the users in the dataset, 
identifing 80 tweets from Celebrity Agents. To identify MP Agents, we used a list of Twitter 
handles of 590 MPs who served between the 2015 and 2017 general elections, identifying 
 
7 Twitter’s streaming API has a policy of allowing users to collect one percent of worldwide daily Twitter communications. 
The volume of data collected for this study did not breach Twitter’s daily limits at any point. We ensured this by looking at 
the total number of tweets collected during the study period and we did not observe the total number of tweets plateau at 
any given hour, suggesting that our dataset has never been throttled by the one percent API limit. Therefore, it is unlikely 
there are any missing data based on rate limiting for this study. 
8 This figure is calculated by counting retweets and original tweets separately. We report this figure to be consistent with 
the original larger dataset the UK subsample was filtered from. The number of original tweets (excluding retweets) is 
1,232,744. 
9 False positives were anticipated due to commonly used keywords in the media pattern. For example, any Twitter user 
can add the keyword ‘reporter’ to their description (which can even contain a negative sentiment e.g. ‘I don’t trust 
reporters’), leading to false positives. To check the accuracy of the identification, a random sample of 100 users was 
manually inspected for false positives. Only 13 false positives were identified, meaning 87 per cent of true positives of 
Media Agents were identified correctly. 
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2,950 tweets.10 To identify Police Agents, a list of force area Twitter accounts was used in 
combination with identifying lower level accounts (e.g. at basic command unit). In total 162 
tweets were identified as emanating from Police Agents. To identify Jewish Organisation 
agents we pattern matched user descriptions against the terms ’Jew’, ’Jewish’ and ’Jewry’ 
and identified all Jewish organisations followed by @CST_UK. A resulting 102 Jewish 
organisation agents were found in the UK dataset, generating 11,599 tweets in the study 
period. To identify known antisemitic agents, we used a pre-defined list of twenty-four 
accounts which was supplied by CST. In total 13,240 tweets were identified as posted by 
these agents.11 All other users that did not fall into any of these agent types were classified 




We devised a supervised machine learning methodology to classify antagonistic content 
related to Jews in the Twitter dataset. Work on identifying hate speech has shown variable 
success rates with accurate classification across multiple protected characteristics. In 
particular, machine learning has been found to be most accurate at classifying anti-Muslim 
hate speech (see Burnap & Williams, 2015). Building a classifier to identify antisemitic hate 
speech proved particularly problematic due to the high degree of disagreement between 
human coders on what they considered as hateful. Much of the confusion stemmed from a 
conflation of antisemitic and anti-Israel content on Twitter. 12 
 
Given this complexity, a two-stage process to attaining gold standard human annotation 
was performed to create a training dataset for the machine learning classifier (see 
Appendix-1 for a detailed discussion). The training dataset included 853 human-validated 
tweets, where 388 instances were annotated as antagonistic towards Jews and Jewish 
identity and 465 were annotated as non-antagonistic. This human-annotated dataset was 
used as the gold standard to train the machine learning classifier. We experimented with 
multiple supervised learning techniques when building the classifier. Both 10-fold cross-
validation and 70/30 split validation results suggested that overall the most efficient 
machine learning technique for classifying antagonistic content in this dataset was Support 
Vector Machines combined with a Bag of Words approach (see Appendix-2 for a detailed 
discussion of other algorithms we experimented with and Appendix-3 for the computational 
cost of the study). In total, this method identified 9,008 original tweets as antagonistic, 
representing 0.7 per cent of the 1,232,744 original tweets in the UK dataset. This is 
commensurate with the volume of antagonistic tweets related to Muslim identity following 
terror attacks in the UK (0.9 per cent; see Williams and Burnap 2016). Upon inspection of 
the classification results, we are confident that the classifier was able to distinguish between 
 
10 This list was compiled by a web service (i.e. http://www.mpsontwitter. co.uk), which tracks Twitter accounts of MPs. 
Please note that only 590 out of 650 had active Twitter accounts.  
11 Note that not all of this content was identified as antagonistic in the analysis. 
12 CST (2017:27) notes that:  
“Clearly it would not be acceptable to define all anti-Israel activity as antisemitic; but it cannot be ignored that 
contemporary antisemitism can occur in the context of, or be accompanied by, extreme feelings over the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Discourse relating to the conflict is used by antisemitic incident offenders to abuse Jews; 
and anti-Israel discourse can sometimes repeat, or echo, antisemitic language and imagery. Drawing out these 
distinctions, and deciding on where the dividing lines lie, is one of the most difficult areas of CST’s work in 
recording and analysing hate crime.” 
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antagonistic content related to Jews and non-antagonistic posts that contained a 




Exploratory Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
    
In the first stage of exploratory data analysis, we visualised the UK dataset and the 
antagonistic sub-dataset to identify periods of interest to the next stage of analysis. The 
periods of interest were then isolated for statistical modelling to identify the enablers and 
inhibitors of the production of antagonistic content, and the factors that predict information 
flow size and survival. Figure 1 presents a daily aggregated time-series line graph of overall 
tweet frequency (black line) and antagonistic tweets (red line) based on the UK dataset. The 
volume of tweets containing the keywords used for the collection varies considerably over 
time. For instance, the highest peak in the complete study period for all tweets is around 
28th April 2016, the day that Ken Livingstone was suspended from the Labour Party, and the 
day after Naz Shah MP was suspended, both for alleged antisemitic comments. This 
observation indicates offline events probably trigger online discussions that contain the 
keywords used in the collection, confirming both H1 and previous research (Hanes and 
Machin 2014; Williams and Burnap 2016). The Figure-1 also compares the volume of 
antagonistic tweets to all tweets using the same scale, illustrating their relatively low 
frequency over the study period. 
 
 
Figure 1: Tweet Frequency (12 months)  
 





Figure 2: Antagonistic Tweet Frequency (12 months)  
 






Figure-2 presents a line graph of antagonistic content related to Jews in the UK dataset. 
Even though the frequency pattern of antagonistic tweets is not identical to the pattern of 
all tweets presented in Figure-1, there are similarities. For example, the highest peak in 
antagonistic tweets is late April/early May 2016, following the Shah/ Livingstone events. The 
second highest peak in antagonistic content is mid-June 2016, which is also in line with the 
peak in mid-June in Figure 1, indicating antagonistic content peaks and falls are in line with 
general discussions about Jews on Twitter. The EDA enabled us to visualise the temporal 
patterns of both antagonistic and non-antagonistic tweets in the UK dataset. As the primary 
aim of the analysis was to predict the enablers and inhibitors of the production of 
antagonistic content and of the propagation of information flows via statistical modelling, 
we selected three events of interest around the highest three peaks in Figure 2: Event-1 
includes all tweets posted between 27th April 2016 and 13th May 2016; Event 2 includes all 
tweets posted between 15th June 2016 and 1st July 2016; and Event 3 includes all tweets 
posted between 12th August 2016 and 28th August 2016. 
 
 
Information Propagation models  
Dependent measures 
     
There are two dependent measures in information propagation modelling: Size of 
information flows (measured by counting the number of retweets) and Survival of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532492
 
 
information flows (measured by counting the seconds between the first and last retweet 
within the study period). In terms of size, the number of retweets is a measure of the 
volume of public interest and endorsement of the information, while survival (or duration) is 
a measure of the persistence of interest over time. These measures are established in the 
literature on online social networks and information propagation (Yang and Counts 2009; 




Three sets of variables were entered as independent predictors of information flow size and 
survival in the models: Content factors, Social factors and Control factors. Content factors 
relate to the text of the tweet. The following text content factors were included: sentiment 
(binary negative/positive); URLs pointing to an external source (such as a news item); 
hashtags which create an interest-based micro-network; and antagonistic content, which is 
the outcome of our machine learning classifier. Social factors relate to the characteristics of 
user accounts. In the models, the following user social features were included: number of 
followers; verified status; and agent type. The presence of police agents and celebrities 
were either extremely small or non- existent across all three events of interest. Therefore, 
police and celebrity agents were re-classified under other agents and five agent types were 
included: media; MPs; Jewish organisations; known antisemitic accounts; and other agents. 
Multiple control factors were included that have been shown to influence the flow of 
information in social media networks (Zarrella, 2009). These include time of day and day of 

























Antagonistic Content Models 
Dependent and Independent Measures 
             
For predicting the production of content, which was antagonistic toward Jewish identity, we 
used the results of our machine learning classifier for the original text as the dependent 
variable. We converted classification results into a binary numeric format where ‘1’ 
represents antagonistic content and ‘0’ represents non-antagonistic content. For 
independent variables, we used the same independent variables (i.e. content factors, social 
factors and control factors), as described in the information propagation models. 
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Methods of estimation13 
Information propagation size model 
      
To predict the size of information flows, we use zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
regression. We fit ZINB regression models as the size measure is best described as a count of 
retweets, where zeroes were present (i.e. some tweets were not retweeted during the 
study period). Zero-inflated count variables represent types of events that are largely not 
experienced by the majority of the sample. In this case, it is retweets where the majority of 
tweets are not retweeted with a minority being retweeted. Linear regression models are not 
appropriate for count variables given the nonnormal distribution of the errors. We opted to 
use ZINB regression over zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression because the dependent 
variable was overdispersed.  
 
Information propagation survival model 
To predict the survival of the information flows, we used Cox’s proportional hazards 
regression (1972). Our interest here was to model the factors that pose hazards to the 
survival of information flows i.e. duration of a retweet (in seconds) within the study period. 




Since this variable was best described as binary (0= non-antagonistic; 1=antagonistic), we 
estimated the production of antagonistic content by using generalised ordered logit 





Results of cyberhate models for each event are presented in Table 4. Across all events, 
accounts identified as antisemitic by CST were most likely to produce antagonistic content 
related to Jews, lending strong evidence in support of the H2. This is unsurprising given the 
nature of these accounts and their posting history. This finding also lends strong evidence in 
support of the semantic accuracy of the machine learning classifier built for this study. The 
only other variables that increased the likelihood of the production of antagonistic content 
were the control factors of day of week and time of day. 
      
All remaining factors in the analysis decreased the likelihood of the production of 
antagonistic content. Social factors, such as type of tweeting agent, account verification 
status, and retweet count, were all negatively associated with the production of 
antagonistic content. Across all events, verified accounts, those that Twitter deem are ‘of 
public interest and authentic’, were significantly less likely to be associated with 
antagonistic content, compared to non-verified accounts. Many of these accounts belong to 
 
13 Given the nature of the social media data (i.e. data are not sampled from a larger population), rather than statistical 
significance, effect sizes should be interpreted primarily across all models. 
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celebrities, public figures, politicians, news organisations, charities, corporations, and 
government departments. Media Agents and unsurprisingly Jewish organisations and media 
were also significantly less likely to produce antagonistic content. These negative 
associations add further evidence in support of the accuracy of the machine learning 
classifier. 
      
Similar to previous research on the spread of online hate speech, tweets containing 
links to other content (URLs) were less likely to contain antagonistic content. URLs are 
possibly less common in antagonistic tweets given linked content (most often popular media 
sources) is less likely to support antisemitic opinion. Contrary to previous research (Williams 
& Burnap, 2016), the inclusion of hashtags in tweets was negatively associated with the 
production of antagonistic content across the three events. This may suggest users 
publishing antisemitic content do not aim to increase the discoverability of their messages 
outside their follower networks. 
 
 
   
 





Information Propagation Size Model 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the size models. Sample size in each event only indicates 
original tweets, with the number of retweets entered as the dependent variable. Incidence-
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Rate Ratios (IRRs) are used to indicate the magnitude of the effect on retweets.14 Of 
particular note is the negative relationship between antagonistic content and the size of 
retweets. In all three events, antagonistic content did not propagate in terms of size (IRR: 
0.285, 0.510 and 0.441 respectively), providing strong support for H5 and confirming 
previous work on anti-Muslim online hate speech (Williams & Burnap, 2016). 
Correspondingly, the content posted by antisemitic agents identified by CST did not 
propagate to a significant extent across the three events. This double negative pattern 
provides further confidence in the accuracy of the machine learning classifier for 
antagonistic content related to Jewish identity. It is important to note that while this 
content did not propagate, it was produced and published by a minority of Twitter users 
during the events under study. 
     
      
Across all three events, content posted from Twitter verified accounts was most likely to 
be retweeted in volume, an unsurprising finding given the types of users behind these 
accounts. In all but one of the events (Event 3) MPs were highly likely to be retweeted. This 
pattern is repeated in relation to Jewish organisations, providing strong support for H3. 
Across all three events, Media Agents were positively associated with larger size of 
information flows, supporting previous research that indicates ‘old media’ greatly influence 







14 An IRR is a univariate transformation of the estimated coefficient for the ZINB model. It is a relative difference measure 
used to compare the incidence rates of events (retweets) occurring at any given point in time. A score above 1 indicates an 
increased incidence rate ratio and below 1 a reduced incidence rate ratio for retweets. 








Information Propagation Survival Model 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the information flow survival models for the three events. 
Positive estimates in the Cox regression models are interpreted as increased hazards to 
survival and therefore a reduction in the duration of information flows on Twitter. In all 
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events, antagonistic content is negatively associated with long-lasting information flows. In 
two of the events, it emerges as having the highest positive hazard ratio. Supporting H6, this 
finding corroborates previous that shows online antisemitic hate speech does not propagate 
in terms of size or survival (Williams & Burnap, 2016). Figures 3, 5 and 7 visualise the 
survival estimates of antagonistic content in the 15-day analysis windows of each event. 
They show that these antisemitic information flows survived between one to three days. 
This sharp de-escalation once again lends evidence to H6 and resonates with research that 
shows offline hate crime following trigger events has a ‘half- life’ (King and Sutton 2013; 
Legewie 2013). It seems likely that this offline pattern is replicated in relation to online 
antagonistic content concerning Jews.  
     
Figures 3, 5 and 7 visualise the survival estimates for different agent types. Unexpectedly, 
antisemitic agents emerged as having the fourth and fifth highest negative hazard ratios in 
Event 1 and Event 3. This indicates that information flows emanating from some of these 
agents during these events were likely to outlast those emanating from other agents at 
some points in the 15-day analysis windows. These figures show that, while information 
flows from antisemitic agents can last between three and seven days, these are in a 
minority, as many of them die out rapidly (indicated by the steep decline in the red lines). 
Conversely, many more information flows emanating from Jewish organisations survive 
between three and seven days in all events (indicated by a less steep decline in the green 
lines). This finding is novel and shows information flows from antisemitic agents gain less 
traction in terms of duration than flows produced by organisations challenging these 
negative narratives on social media. Furthermore, information flows emanating from Jewish 
organizations emerge as having the lowest hazard to survival across all events, strongly 
supporting H4.  
      
      
General Media Agents emerged as having positive hazard ratios for all three events, with 
many information flows dying out evenly over the study window (the yellow line). As 
indicated in previous research, this is likely to be a result of frequent news turnover, where 
new stories replace old ones on a daily basis. These new stories create new information 
flows that replace the old (Williams & Burnap, 2016).  
 
 












































In this paper, we demonstrated how using social media (meta)data when coupled with 
computational criminology methods (i.e. pattern matching, supervised machine learning 
classification detecting cyberhate, information propagation modelling) can contribute to 
conventional hate crime recording practices and extend our understanding of online trends 
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of antisemitism. Our analysis showed significant variability in the frequency of antagonistic 
tweets related to Jews over the 12-month study period. Supporting H1, we demonstrated 
offline events, such as the antisemitism row in the Labour party, can trigger online 
discussion around Jewish identity and antisemitic sentiments. The analysis also revealed the 
frequency of antagonistic content was on average 32 per cent higher in the second half of 
2016. CST found a similar sustained increase in incidents reported both on and offline in the 
same period (CST 2017). Similar to previous research related to anti-Muslim sentiment on 
Twitter (Williams and Burnap 2016), we found that only 0.7 per cent of tweets referring to 
Jews and Jewish identity were classified as antagonistic. Although this finding contradicts 
with previous higher antisemitism rates of global tweets (ADL 2018), it suggests that only a 
small proportion of the content relating to Jews on UK-based Twitter are antagonistic, 
confirming previous research (Williams and Burnap 2016).  
 
 
Across all three events subjected to statistical modelling, our logit model predicting the 
presence of hate speech suggests that accounts identified as antisemitic by CST were most 
likely to produce antagonistic content, while verified and media accounts were least likely. 
These findings lend strong support for our H2 and provide evidence in support of the 
accuracy of the machine learning classifier built for this study. H5 and H6 also demonstrated 
that antisemitic content was less likely to be retweeted in volume and to survive for long 
periods across all events, supporting previous research on the ‘half-life’ of hate speech on 
social media (Burnap et al. 2014; Williams and Burnap 2016). Non-propagation in terms of 
size means that antagonistic content was not retweeted (shared by other Twitter users) to a 
great extent and most of the time none at all. This is an encouraging finding which indicates 
that the majority of Twitter users do not endorse these types of posts via the act of 
retweeting. Non-propagation of hate within the Twitter community might be interpreted as 
a demonstration of collective efficacy on Twitter. However, we would like to remain 
conservative with this claim as there may be other confounding factors. Research shows 
that where antagonistic content is retweeted, it is contained within online ‘echo chambers’ 
of like-minded individuals and if the size of this community is likely to affect the volume of 
information propagation.  
 
 
The small (in terms of retweeting) but sustained (in terms of survivability) information flows 
of a minority of antisemitic agents indicate that there is limited endorsement of these 
Twitter narratives. Yet, where there is support it emanates from a core group who seek out 
each other’s messages over time: an ‘echo chamber’ of like-minded individuals who 
encourage and amplify each other. This suggests that contagion of antagonistic information 
flows appears to be contained and, while it may be viewed by others, it is unlikely to be 
accepted and disseminated widely by other users beyond such groups.  
 
 
We also reported some positive results, particularly with regard to the representation of 
collective efficacy on social media (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson 2001). In support of H3 
and H4, this study revealed that information flows emanating from Jewish organisations 
gained significant traction during two of the three events, as evidenced by the combined 
positive size and survival findings. We found that information flows from antisemitic agents 
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on Twitter gain less traction in terms of duration than information flows produced by 
organisations challenging these negative narratives lending tentative support to the 
effectiveness of ‘collective efficacy’ on social media. This suggests that when organisations 
which aim to counter harmful narratives such as antagonistic speech become active on 
social media platforms, their messages propagate further and achieve higher longevity than 
antagonistic messages. This is a positive finding that underlines the importance of the work 





Police crime and CSEW figures indicate that hate crimes have increased significantly in the 
past few years in the wake of the vote over the UK’s future in the EU and recent terror 
attacks. Despite being useful, conventional hate crime recording practices are limited by 
their reliance on victims or witnesses reporting incident. Correspondingly, the FRA survey 
shows more than three-quarters of antisemitic harassment are never reported, leading to a 
dark figure in hate crime records. There is a clear policy and community safety need to 
devise new methodologies to detect and analyse online antisemitic incidents, as highlighted 
by the FRA. Given the sheer size of social media communications at any given hour, 
manually sifting through millions of posts every month to detect cyberhate would be 
extremely laborious, if even possible. Computational approaches without human input, such 
as unsupervised learning and clustering, are limited when detecting future instances of 
cyberhate. Instead of relying on ‘terrestrial’ data or reports from the public on antisemitic 
victimisation, this study used a relatively novel online source, Twitter, to mine big social 
media data to reveal patterns of perpetration at the source using a supervised machine 
learning classifier. By doing so, this study has demonstrated how a unique blend of 
computational and social science techniques can be harnessed to transform and analyse 
these new forms of data to gain insight into the growing problem of online antisemitism in 
the UK.  
 
Findings from this study should be a source of some optimism. A key finding of this study is 
that information flows emanating from Jewish organisations, capable and willing counter-
speech actors, had a significantly higher size and survival of retweets. While antisemitism is 
present on Twitter and can cause severe offence when it is not removed, it is challenged by 
positive content, which is present in greater amounts, lasts longer and spreads further than 
hate content. Measuring the production of cyberhate, and the size and survival of 
information flows, this study is the first to evidence the classic sociological notion that 
collective efficacy can be observed on social media. Our findings suggest that counter-
speech posted by credible organisations can be an effective measure to prevent harmful 
narratives, such as online antisemitism. Based on our findings, we underline the value of the 
work of charities and organisations that aim to protect communities, such as ADL and CST. 
The presence of such organisations on social media is key to in increasing trust in digital 
communications and platforms and reducing the propagation of cyberhate.  
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We end this paper with suggestions for future research. The online pattern of antagonistic 
content related to Jews, as identified by text-based classification methods, can act as a 
proxy for the ebb and flow of antisemitism in the UK. However, it should be noted that we 
did not capture tweets that expressed antisemitic conspiracy theories (or allusions to such 
theories) or antisemitic images posted without accompanying the antisemitic text. Future 
research investigating the production and propagation of image-based cyberhate and 
antisemitic theories can further improve our understanding of online antisemitism. 
Furthermore, the quantitative nature of our collective efficacy observation prevents us from 
understanding which type of actions from willing and credible actors helps reduce cyberhate 
perpetration. Future research should look at whether publishing counter-hate speech and 
counterclaims reduce cyberhate on social media platforms and if so, which types of counter-
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Appendix-1: Creating a Training Sample for the Supervised Learning Classifier 
 
 
During the process of machine classification experimentation, it became evident that human 
annotators struggled with classifying antisemitic ‘hate speech’ with a high degree of 
accuracy. In the first stage, we sampled four thousand tweets from the UK dataset and used 
the online Figure8 service to source human annotators to perform annotation tasks on each 
tweet to determine, in their view, whether it was antagonistic in relation to Jews. Human 
coders were asked to identify tweets containing “Antagonistic content related to Jewish 
identity” with a Yes/No response. Given the complexity of criminal law relating to online 
hate and the high threshold used by prosecutors, the term ‘hate speech’ was not used to 
avoid coder confusion between tweets that may constitute a criminal offence, and those 
that may be offensive, but not reach the criminal threshold. Using the term ‘hate speech’ 
may have also resulted in too few tweets being labelled, resulting in insufficient data to 
train the machine learning classifier. We requested four annotators per tweet and removed 
instances from the training data if the inter-annotator agreement score dropped below 75 
per cent. In the second stage, human annotations from the Figure8 dataset were checked 
against the text sample of offensive online communications provided by CST and 
adjustments were made where misclassifications were identified. 
 
In the next stage we conducted a manual ‘sanity checking’ using a sample of antagonistic 
text from Twitter, Facebook, emails and other forms of online communications provided by 
CST. These texts were either reported to CST by the public or identified by CST staff, and 
were deemed to contain antisemitic words and phrases. Not all of the text examples met 
the criminal threshold set out by the CPS for hate speech on social media. However, many of 
them were deemed sufficiently offensive to warrant requests to social media providers to 
delete content for infringing platform Terms of Service. Informed by these antagonistic text 
examples, we checked the consistency of the human annotation on the Figure8 subsample 
with at least 75 per cent agreement score (n=1322). Where deviations were evident we 
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made adjustments to Figure8 coder annotations. For example, tweets coded as antagonistic 
towards Jews in the Figure8 dataset, that were clearly only anti-Israel in nature, were 
recoded as not-antisemitic. In total, 29 per cent of the Figure8 subset was adjusted in this 
way. Although multiple processing steps meant that the number of tweets used for the 
training dataset was less than the initial 4,000 tweets sampled for human annotation, we 
are confident that the training sample was semantically representative of the classification 
problem at hand. 
 
 
Appendix-2: Supervised Machine Learning Classifier for Online Antisemitism on Twitter 
 
 
In preparation for machine classification, the original text was transformed into feature 
vectors by using three feature extraction (FE) methods: Bag of Words (BOW), N-Grams (NG) 
and Typed Dependencies (TD). Four machine learning methods were used for training 
classifiers to identify antagonistic content about Jews: Decision Trees (DT), Naïve Bayes 
(NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Fuzzy Rules. The results of the classification 
experiments are provided in Table 7 using standard text classification measures of: precision 
(P) (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets classified as x when they should not be (false 
positives) - a measure of true positives normalised by the sum of true and false positives); 
recall (R) (i.e., for class x, how often are tweets not classified as x when they should be (false 
negatives) - a measure of true positives normalised by the sum of true positives and false 
negatives); and F-Measure (F), a harmonised mean of precision and recall. The results for 
each measure range between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). We provide results for the hateful class 
(Yes), non-hateful class (No) and overall (average over Yes/No). Initially, we used a 10-fold 
cross-validation approach to test the supervised machine learning method. This functions by 
splitting the dataset into ten equal randomly shuffled subsets and iteratively using nine folds 
to train the classifier and one fold to test it. After ten iterations the results are averaged. It is 
particularly useful with small labelled datasets as was the case in this instance.  
 
 










Table 1 shows that SVM + BOW performed best. The high performance of SVM + BOW is 
likely due to the case that the SVM algorithm only needs a small number of instances as 
support vectors for teaching a classifier (identifying the boundary to separate the two 
classes in multi-dimensional feature space). As the dataset is small it is likely that features 
such as words are more effective as they will occur in each class more frequently than 
bigrams, trigrams and typed dependencies. We experimented further using a 70/30 split on 
the data to train and test the supervised machine learning method. This functions by 
training the classifier with features from 70 per cent of the manually coded dataset, and 
classifying the remaining 30 per cent as ‘unseen’ data, based on the features evident in the 
cases it has encountered. The accuracy of the classification process is then determined. This 
process was repeated five times using the mean average of all runs to calculate the overall 
accuracy. Table 8 shows only the results for the ‘Yes’ class (hateful language), and that SVM 
+ BOW performs best again – this time with perfect classification, while the performance of 
the other methods is much lower. Again, the high performance of SVM + BOW is likely due 
to the SVM algorithm needing only a small number of instances as support vectors for 
teaching a classifier. With the small sample size, exposing the classifier to more examples of 
hate speech in the training process improves its ability to learn generalised word use which 
has led to an exact match between human and machine annotated labels for the hateful 
class. In other cases, such as decision trees and probabilistic approaches such as the NB 
method, more data actually causes further confusion – exemplifying the difficulty in using 
highly frequent words extracted from the short informal text as features, with such a small 
‘gold standard’ dataset. 
 
 
Table 8: Classification Results for Antisemitism Hate Speech – 70/30 Split  
 
         
  
 
Appendix-3: Computational Cost of This Study 
 
Unlike traditional quantitative datasets, such as survey or panel data, ‘big data’ collected 
from social media platforms are not structured to answer social research questions. We 
conducted a series of pre-processing steps to filter the dataset to UK based tweets in 
accordance with the research questions, extract the metrics that would be used to build 
statistical models and automatically identify antagonistic tweets by training a machine 
learning classifier. It is important to note that in computational social science research, 
where the big data are captured from the ‘wild’, it is common practice to spend more time 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532492
 
 
on pre-processing the data. The process of cleaning and structuring raw datasets according 
to research questions is also called data wrangling and it usually takes 80% of the time 
spent on data analysis.  
 
It is, therefore, worth mentioning the computational data processing cost of the conducted 
in this study in order to provide perspective for the reader. Performance wise, our data 
processing pipeline was relatively slow.  Once we were confident with our query inferring 
UK based location from metadata, we extracted roughly 2.7M tweets from UK-based users. 
We tested the performance of the data processing on a small sample on a single core on a 
local desktop computer. Our initial performance tests indicated that it took 4.5 seconds to 
extract various metrics for statistical modelling (agent type, antagonistic content 
classification etc.) for each tweet on average. This was not feasible, given the size of the 
dataset. Roughly, this would take a single desktop computer running on one physical core 
140 days. To shorten the processing time, we refactored our code in a parallelised fashion 
and run the process on High-Performance Computing (HPC) servers of the Supercomputing 
Wales. This allowed our ‘Big Data’ processing job to be split and run concurrently over 
multiple cores and multiple nodes, allowing us to complete the whole data processing (i.e. 
classification and extraction of independent variables) just under 24 hours. We are grateful 
to Supercomputing Wales for enabling this research to run in such a short time. 
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